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THE LOCAL DILEMMA: PREEMPTION AND
THE ROLE OF FEDERAL STANDARDS




N the tug-of-war between federal and state or local laws that touch
immigration,1 we must not lose sight of the practical underpinnings to
the legal hydraulics. After all, the Supremacy Clause declares the
federal Constitution and the laws of the United States to be the supreme
law of the land for a reason.2 A patchwork of fifty state immigration
schemes would simply be untenable. Yet, even in our current state of
equilibrium-which has carved out an amorphous role for state and local
governance-any state or local laws that target immigrants must, necessa-
rily, identify different categories of immigrants and ultimately distinguish
between those who are lawfully present in the United States and those
who are not. Courts have often told states simply to rely on "federal
standards."'3 But this task requires state and local governments to wade
into the morass of federal immigration statutes, regulations, and guidance
documents-a venture with a very low margin of error, and one that is
not for the timid.
Recently, state and local governments have become much less timid.
Driven by palpable frustration with the federal government's regulation
and enforcement of immigration-or more precisely, the lack thereof-
state and local governments have enacted a persistent stream of immigra-
tion-related laws, addressing everything from education to employment
to driver's licenses.4 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated
that the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a
federal power,"'5 state and local governments are not powerless to act.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. I thank Jorge Al-
monte, Natalie Cortez, Luis Parada, and Michael Olivas for their helpful comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts. Any mistakes are my own.
1. Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and
Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 219-20 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1976).
4. Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 32.
5. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354.
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The Supreme Court "has never held that every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se
pre-empted. ''6
The trick for courts has always been deciding where to draw the line.
Despite decades of pronouncements from the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches, the role of state and local governments in immigration
remains stubbornly undefined, teetering between permissible exercises of
authority to regulate education, employment, and other traditional state
concerns, and impermissible encroachments on federal authority. 7
This Article examines one particular strand in the tug-of-war. Can oth-
erwise permissible state and local laws avoid preemption simply by refer-
ring to or relying on federal immigration standards? If so, how must state
and local laws manifest their reliance? Should we trust state and local
agents to adhere faithfully to the seemingly impenetrable web of federal
standards? Or is the likelihood too great that state and local actors will
systematically misapply federal standards, effectively creating their own?
One case highlights the precarious position of state and local policies
targeting immigration. The 2004 decisions in Equal Access Education v.
Merten8 illustrate the role federal standards play in the preemption analy-
sis. This case raises serious concerns about the wisdom and propriety of
asking state or local agents to make determinations of immigration sta-
tus-even if they are directed to use federal standards. Given the recent
wave of local immigration-related ordinances, it is time to reevaluate the
role of federal standards in Equal Access Education and other judicial
opinions.
I begin in Part II by discussing the role of federal standards in the
Equal Access Education opinions. In Part III, I analyze how two seminal
cases, DeCanas v. Bica9 and League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Wilson, 10 laid the foundation for the federal standards analyses in later
cases. In Part IV, I scrutinize the recent wave of local immigration-re-
lated ordinances, highlighting how courts have handled the federal stan-
dards question. In Part V, I argue that state and local laws should not
avoid preemption by simply citing to or relying on federal standards, ab-
sent a clear finding that state or local agents will not systematically misap-
ply federal standards.
6. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
7. This Article does not tackle the question of whether Congress should, as a policy
matter, explicitly delegate more responsibility to sub-federal governments to regulate dis-
crete immigration issues that might affect them. For that debate, see Olivas, supra note 4,
and Peter H. Schuck Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57.
8. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004); Equal Access
Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004).
9. DeCanas, 424 U.S. 351.
10. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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II. FEDERAL STANDARDS AND THE VIRGINIA PUBLIC
COLLEGES OPINIONS
On September 5, 2002, Virginia Attorney General Jerry Kilgore sent an
Immigration Law Compliance Update Memorandum to Virginia's public
colleges and universities, declaring that "illegal and undocumented aliens
should not be admitted into our public colleges and universities at all."11
Kilgore also strongly encouraged all public employees at these schools to
report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")12 any in-
formation that may suggest that a student is not "lawfully present" in the
United States. 13 The memorandum explicitly acknowledged that this pol-
icy was not legally binding, conceding that, "as strictly a legal matter, in-
stitutions have broad discretion to decide what documentation they will
request of applicants, and how they will treat applicants who are not law-
fully present in the United States."1 4 Nevertheless, the memorandum
strongly encouraged public colleges and universities in Virginia to reject
outright any applications from "illegal and undocumented aliens.' 15
In justifying the policy, Kilgore pointed to national security concerns,
citing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.16 As Virginia Attorney
General, Kilgore had well-known political aspirations: In 2005, he ran as
the Republican candidate for Governor of Virginia, eventually losing the
election to Democrat Tim Kaine. 17 Earlier in Kilgore's tenure as Virginia
Attorney General, the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles had been
criticized for issuing driver's licenses to eight of the September 11th hi-
jackers.18 Thus, the 2002 memorandum was a convenient political vehicle
through which Kilgore could demonstrate his commitment to national
security.
11. Memorandum from Allison P. Landry, Assistant Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of
Va., to Executive Director, State Council for Higher Educ. in Va. 5 (Sept. 5, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-02APL.pdf [hereinafter
Virginia Attorney General Memorandum].
12. In 2002, Congress reorganized federal responsibility for immigration when it cre-
ated the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), a cabinet-level agency. Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). Most of the functions
performed by the INS were subsumed into U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS"), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection ("CBP") within the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). Id.
13. Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 11, at 11.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3 ("As our national response to the attacks of September 11 continues, it has
become increasingly clear that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the
higher education community must pay closer attention to the presence of foreign students
and exchange visitors on their campuses.").
17. Michael Suss, Kaine, Clearly, ROANOKE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al.
18. See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, Hijackers Exploited DMV Loophole, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 21, 2001, at A15 (stating that four of the hijackers on American Airlines Flight 77
that crashed into the Pentagon had Virginia driver's licenses); Dale Russakoff, States Move
to Halt Fraud in Licensing of Drivers; Sept. 11 Attacks Exposed Weaknesses Nationwide,




But the memorandum also served a more immediate purpose for Vir-
ginia. It asked somewhat rhetorically, "[i]f a person is an illegal alien,
why would he not be deported instead of being allowed to attend college
here?" 19 The Virginia Attorney General answered that the INS does not
adequately enforce federal immigration laws.20 This memorandum, then,
also served as Virginia's response to the perception that the federal gov-
ernment was not effectively regulating immigration.
In September 2003, five high school students and Equal Access Educa-
tion, an educational rights group for immigrants, challenged the memo-
randum in federal district court in the Eastern District of Virginia.21 The
five students initially tried to proceed anonymously-given their concerns
of being reported to federal authorities-but after the court denied this
attempt,22 only two students chose to identify themselves for purposes of
the litigation. 23
The two students could not have been of the mold Virginia Attorney
General Kilgore had in mind when issuing his Immigration Law Compli-
ance Memorandum, with its self-stated goal of fortifying national security.
One student, Brian Marroquin, was born in Guatemala and entered the
United States on a tourist visa with his parents when he was just three
years old.24 Marroquin's parents left Guatemala fearing reprisals for par-
ticipating in student protests, as Marroquin's grandfather and uncle were
apparently murdered for similar political activities.25 Shortly after arriv-
ing in the United States, Marroquin's parents filed applications for politi-
cal asylum. 26 Almost a decade later, while these applications were still
pending, they filed additional applications for asylum2 7 under the Nicara-
guan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NA-
CARA"), a special program for certain immigrants from former Soviet
bloc countries. 28 Marroquin grew up attending public schools in Arling-
ton, Virginia, enrolling in gifted student programs, and volunteering for
19. Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4.
20. Id. at 4-5 ("The answer to the question resides in part with the difficulties, priori-
ties, and abilities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in enforcing this
nation's immigration laws.").
21. Doe v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Va. 2004). The plaintiffs were represented by
attorneys from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF)
and the Washington, D.C.-based law firm Arnold & Porter LLP. As an attorney at Arnold
& Porter, I represented the students on a pro bono basis, along with several other attor-
neys at the firm.
22. Id. at 396.
23. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592 (E.D. Va. 2004).
24. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 663 (E.D. Va. 2004); Amy
Argetsinger, Va. Student Unsure of His Standing; Colleges' Views Differ on Immigrant's
Status, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2004, at B1.
25. Argetsinger, supra note 24.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-100 § 203(1)1, 111 Stat. 2196-97, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644
(1997) [hereinafter NACARA]. Section 203 of NACARA amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101 to
allow certain immigrants from former Soviet bloc countries, such as Guatemala and El
Salvador, to apply for suspensions of deportation or for cancellation of removal.
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his church and other local organizations. 29 He even interned at the U.S.
Department of Energy.30
The other plaintiff, Fredy Vasquez, was born in El Salvador, and had a
similar upbringing in northern Virginia. 31 When the plaintiffs filed suit,
Vasquez enjoyed Temporary Protected Status ("TPS"), which allowed
him to work legally in the United States.32
Both plaintiffs graduated from Virginia public high schools33 with cre-
dentials and accomplishments that made them competitive for admission
to Virginia's public colleges and universities.34 When the Virginia Attor-
ney General issued the Immigration Law Compliance Memorandum in
September 2002, Marroquin and Vasquez had either applied or intended
to apply to the schools eventually named in the complaint, including
George Mason University, James Madison University, Northern Virginia
Community College, the University of Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University ("Virginia
Tech"), and the College of William and Mary.35
The suit alleged that by denying admission to applicants based on their
actual or perceived immigration status, the Virginia schools violated the
Supremacy, 36 Due Process, 37 and Foreign Commerce Clauses 38 of the'
U.S. Constitution. 39 Following a motion to dismiss, in Equal Access Edu-
cation v. Merten ("Equal Access Education I"),40 the court found that
Marroquin, Vasquez, and Equal Access Education all had standing to
challenge the Attorney General's policy. 41 The court dismissed the Due
Process and Foreign Commerce Clause claims, but engaged in a lengthy
analysis of the Supremacy Clause claims.42 Plaintiffs argued that federal
law should preempt the Virginia Attorney General's policy because (i) it
29. Argetsinger, supra note 24.
30. Id.
31. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 668 (E.D. Va. 2004); Doe v.
Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 389 (E.D. Va. 2004).
32. Equal Access Educ., 325 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
33. Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982),
guaranteed even undocumented immigrants the right to a public education.
34. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 3, Equal
Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004) (No. 03-1113-A), 2004 WL
3756553 [hereinafter Merten Complaint].
35. Id. at 4-6. After the Virginia Attorney General issued the memorandum, North-
ern Virginia Community College stated publicly that it would not follow the policy and
thus would not consider immigration status in the admissions process. See Peter Whoris-
key, NVCC Allowing Illegal Immigrants to Enroll; College Defends Policy After State Attor-
ney General Urges Admissions Ban, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at T23 (quoting the NVCC
Vice President of Academic and Student Services as saying" "We're not trying to open our
doors to terrorists or people who were trying to sneak across our borders. We are trying to
serve residents who have been here for many years.").
36. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiffs brought the Due Process claim under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
39. Merten Complaint, supra note 34, at 8-9.
40. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
41. Id. at 594-600.
42. Id. at 601-14.
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attempted to regulate immigration, (ii) Congress left no room for such
state intervention, and (iii) it conflicted with federal immigration law.43
In scrutinizing these claims,44 the court applied the three tests estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in DeCanas v. Bica.45 In DeCanas, the
Court held that federal law did not preempt a California statute barring
employers from "knowingly employ[ing] an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers. '46 In upholding the statute,
the Court established its three famous tests, asking: (i) whether the state
policy or action attempts to "regulate immigration";47 (ii) whether Con-
gress intends to "occupy the field" and completely ouster state interven-
tion in the area;48 and (iii) whether the state policy or action conflicts
with federal law, such that compliance with both federal and state law is
impossible, or such that the policy "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."'49 The Court in DeCanas concluded that federal law did not
preempt the California statute under the three tests.50 However, a state
law or policy is preempted if it fails just one DeCanas test.51
'In Equal Access Education I, the court held that Virginia's policy would
not fail the first DeCanas test unless the schools failed to adopt "federal
standards" in assessing the immigration status of applicants. 52 The court
explained that
If [plaintiffs] ultimately can show that defendants have failed to
adopt federal immigration standards in implementing their policies
of denying admission to illegal aliens, and instead have either implic-
itly or explicitly developed their own, different standards, then de-
fendants' alleged policies would amount to a regulation of
immigration under the first DeCanas test.53
In applying the second DeCanas test, the Court found that Congress
did not intend to fully ouster policies like Virginia's. 54 In a perfunctory
analysis, the court held that federal law "does not preclude state institu-
tions from using federal standards to deny admission to illegal aliens. '55
The Court reasoned that Congress had not demonstrated "a clear and
manifest purpose ... to oust non-conflicting state laws and policies in the
43. Merten Complaint, supra note 34, at 8.
44. Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
45. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-63 (1976).
46. Id. at 352 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805).
47. Id. at 354-56.
48. Id. at 356-63.
49. Id. at 363-65.
50. Id. at 351.
51. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
52. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 603 (E.D. Va. 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 604.
55. Id. at 604.
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area of alien access to post-secondary education. ' 56 Thus, in the court's
view, federal law did not preempt decisions by state colleges and universi-
ties to deny admission to illegal or undocumented immigrants, so long as
the schools used federal immigration standards to do so.
57
Finally, the court held that Virginia's policy would not conflict with fed-
eral law and thus fail the third DeCanas test unless the schools were using
state-created immigration standards. 58 Thus, at the motion to dismiss
stage, the court held that if plaintiffs could prove at summary judgment or
at trial that the Virginia schools were using immigration standards other
than those prescribed by the federal government, the policy would not
only constitute an impermissible regulation of immigration under the first
DeCanas test, but would also be an impermissible classification system in
conflict with federal law under the third DeCanas test.5 9 In the court's
view, then, preemption hinged upon whether Virginia schools were using
federal immigration standards when reviewing applications for
admission.60
By allowing this specific claim to survive defendants' motions to dis-
miss, the plaintiffs were allowed to gather evidence as to how the schools
were determining whether applicants were "illegal," "undocumented," or
otherwise not "lawfully present," as directed by the Virginia Attorney
General's memorandum.61 Yet the court never reached the merits on this
issue. At the summary judgment phase, in the subsequent Equal Access
Education decision ("Equal Access Education IF'), the court held that
none of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims, reversing its
prior decision.62 In the process, the court did not opine on whether the
Virginia schools were in fact using non-federal standards in determining
the immigration status of applicants.63
Some authors have misconstrued the court's opinion as holding that
the schools actually used federal standards, 64 or that the policy did not in
fact violate the Supremacy Clause.65 The court explicitly stated that it did
not reach the merits on these issues, and that schools' activities may very
well violate the Supremacy Clause if the schools were using state-created
56. Id. at 607.
57. Id. at 604.
58. Id. at 608.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 603.
61. Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4-5.
62. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 655 (E.D. Va. 2004).
63. Id. at 672 (noting that "nothing in this memorandum opinion takes a position on
the merits issues in this case").
64. See, e.g., Maria Pab6n L6pez, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocu-
mented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2005); David
S. Keenan, Comment, The Difference a Day Makes: How Courts Circumvent Federal Immi-
gration Law at Sentencing, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139, 150 (2007); Kendra Nichols, Va.
Judge Dismisses Immigrants' Law Suit, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2004, at 24.
65. James D. Jorgensen & Lelia B. Helms, Recent Developments in Public Education
Law: Postsecondary Education 2004-05, 37 URB. LAW. 957, 960 (2005).
2008]
SMU LAW REVIEW
standards or were systematically misapplying federal standards.66
In fact, the discovery process revealed that many Virginia schools were
not using federal immigration standards-effectively creating their own
standards-or were regularly misapplying federal standards, or both.67
For example, some schools misunderstood entire categories of immigra-
tion established under federal law; some classified certain applicants as
"unlawfully present" even though the federal government would have
reached the opposite conclusion; some school policies failed to identify a
single federal standard to be used in determining the status of applicants;
and most school employees making these determinations either received
no training or woefully inadequate training.68
The court itself acknowledged that "some defendants have made mis-
takes in determining an applicant's immigration status," even though the
court's opinion could not address whether those mistakes were systematic
enough to constitute impermissible state-created standards. 69 Neverthe-
less, in its final footnote, the court felt it was "worth noting that some
defendants ... have responded to plaintiffs' concerns about the potential
for mistakes by sensibly instituting training for admissions officers and
putting in place an appeal process for applicants who claim they have
been misclassified as illegal aliens."' 70 This final footnote was a small con-
solation prize in an opinion that left an important factual issue unset-
tled-an issue courts have struggled with before and after Equal Access
Education.
III. FEDERAL STANDARDS IN TWO SEMINAL CASES
Of course, other courts have struggled to determine the precise role
federal standards should play in the preemption analysis, and whether
state and local actors should have any authority to determine someone's
immigration status. For example, in DeCanas v. Bica, a California statute
levied fines between $200 and $500 for each incident in which an em-
ployer "knowingly" employed immigrants "not entitled to lawful resi-
dence in the United States. ' 71 The statute provided no guidance on how
employers should try to determine whether workers were entitled to
"lawful residence in the United States. '72 In implementing the statute,
66. Equal Access Educ., 325 F. Supp. 2d at 672-73.
67. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004) (No. 03-
1113-Al), 2004 WL 3756550.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Equal Access Educ., 325 F. Supp. 2d at 673 ("While it is true that the factual record
reflects that some defendants have made mistakes in determining an applicant's immigra-
tion status, the issue of whether these mistakes are systematic so as to amount effectively
to the creation of state standards is not reached in light of the standing and summary
judgment rulings reached here.").
70. Id. at 673 n.34.




the California Director of Industrial Relations passed regulations stating
that:
An alien entitled to lawful residence shall mean any non-citizen of
the United States who is in possession of a Form 1-151, Alien Regis-
tration Receipt Card, or any other document issued by the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service which authorizes him
to work.73
However, neither the lower courts nor the U.S. Supreme Court passed
judgment on the adequacy or constitutionality of these regulations. 74 Nor
did they address whether California could fairly expect employers to
make these determinations, or the likelihood that employers would sys-
temically and consistently misapply the federal standards cited in the reg-
ulations. The courts seemed to be satisfied that the California regulations
simply required employers to use federal standards.
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson ("LULAC I"),75
the district court thoroughly analyzed how federal immigration standards
should be used by state and local agents. In LULAC I, the court assessed
whether federal immigration law preempted California's Proposition 187,
a comprehensive voter initiative passed in 1994 that limited undocu-
mented immigrants' access to public benefits and services. 76 As de-
scribed by the court, Proposition 187 required state agents
[T]o question all arrestees, applicants for medical and social services,
students, and parents of students about their immigration status; to
obtain and examine documents relating to the immigration status of
such persons; to identify "suspected" "illegal" immigrants present in
California; to report suspected "illegal" immigrants to state and fed-
eral authorities; and to instruct people suspected of being in the
United States illegally to obtain "legal status" or "leave the
country. " 7 7
Thus, Proposition 187 called on state agents to independently judge who
may receive state benefits, who must be reported to the authorities, and
who may lawfully remain in the United States.78 The court found a lim-
ited, carefully circumscribed role for state agents to determine who may
receive government benefits, but struck down the other provisions.79
In assessing the constitutionality of these separate requirements, the
court distinguished "determining" immigration status from merely "veri-
fying" immigration status, and further distinguished using federal stan-
dards from using independent or state-created standards.80 First, the
73. Id. at 364 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 16209).
74. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 364-65.
75. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
[hereinafter LULAC I].
76. Id. at 764-65.
77. Id. at 769.
78. Id. at 769-70.




court clarified that state agents are often authorized to verify immigration
status when reviewing applications for federal and/or state benefits such
as Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), and
Food Stamps.8 ' In such cases, state agents can verify immigration status
by accessing federal databases such as SAVE-the Systematic Alien Ver-
ification for Entitlements program.8 2 These joint federal-state programs
allow state agents to "perform a ministerial rather than a discretionary
function in verifying immigration status. ' 83 As the court noted, verifying
immigration status by referring to federal databases is much different
than making independent judgments of who is lawfully present in the
United States.8 4 The court emphasized that because state agents are un-
trained and unauthorized to make these determinations, such policies risk
that "inconsistent and inaccurate judgments will be made. '8 5
Of course, this analysis begs the question of whether state agents can
ever appropriately determine a person's immigration status by referring
to federal standards without relying on a separate, authoritative federal
determination of status. If granted any discretion to interpret and apply
federal standards, can we trust state agents to faithfully apply these stan-
dards? Given the complexity of these determinations, there is a high like-
lihood that any program requiring state agents to apply federal
immigration standards would be rife with errors. Nevertheless, the court
in LULAC I upheld several of the benefits denial provisions in Proposi-
tion 187 under the DeCanas tests because state regulations implementing
the new law "could" require agents to rely on federal determinations and
"could" deny state agents the discretion to use non-federal standards.8 6
Likewise, the court in Equal Access Education put faith in the ability of
state agents to apply federal immigration standards so long as Virginia's
formal policy directed them to do so.8 7 Professor Benson has been one of
the few authors to appreciate the irony of the court's holding.8 8 She
notes that "several pages of the opinion are devoted to deciphering ex-
actly what [Marroquin's] status was under federal law," and that "[ifn
spite of the obvious challenges the court itself faced in determining status
based on federal standards, and the strong possibility of error, the court
held that states are entrusted with the power of determining who is illegal
based upon federal standards. '8 9 In fact, Marroquin's own attorneys and
immigration experts had difficulty ascertaining his true immigration sta-
81. Id. at 770.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7 (2000).
83. LULAC I, 908 F. Supp. at 770.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 770-71, 787.
87. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (2004).
88. Lenni B. Benson, Separate, Unequal, and Alien: Comments on the Limits of Brown,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 727, 733 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
89. Id. at 733-34.
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tus.90 Moreover, as an epilogue to the court's decision that Marroquin
was not "lawfully present," a spokesman for U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services told the Washington Post that the federal government
considers someone with Marroquin's work permit to be lawfully present
in the United States.91
If a federal judge (and admittedly, several lawyers and immigration ex-
perts) struggled to ascertain the status of just one immigrant, how can we
expect state agents-or more acutely, private employers or landlords-to
ascertain the immigration status of dozens, or even hundreds, of immi-
grants? In Equal Access Education II, the court did acknowledge that the
Virginia policy may be preempted by federal law if the schools misapplied
federal standards "in a systemic and pervasive manner. ' '92 The court rec-
ognized that a school would effectively be using state-created standards if
it made frequent and systematic errors in applying federal standards. 93
In the aftermath of Equal Access Education II, some schools changed
their admissions policies despite the court ultimately dismissing the case
for lack of standing. For example, George Mason University decided not
to condition either admission or enrollment on immigration status be-
cause of the difficulties in making immigration determinations.94 George
Mason's Dean of Admissions stated that, "[t]he idea that universities
would need to develop expertise in the very complex area of immigration
law is both problematic and probably unrealistic. ' 95 He explained that
determining whether applicants were lawfully present did not fit school
officials' roles as educators. 96
Nevertheless, the Virginia Attorney General's 2002 Immigration Law
Compliance Update Memorandum remains available on the web site of
the Virginia State Council for Higher Education, 97 despite the high likeli-
hood that at least some schools are systematically misapplying federal im-
migration standards. These 2004 opinions by the Eastern District of
Virginia foreshadowed the legal and practical difficulties raised by the
recent wave of local immigration-related ordinances-particularly the
question of whether local ordinances can avoid preemption simply by cit-
ing to federal immigration standards.
90. Equal Access Educ., 325 F. Supp. 2d at 662. As counsel for Marroquin, we discov-
ered during the litigation that Marroquin, as a minor, was the derivative beneficiary of his
father's pending asylum application, which changed our earlier position that he was not
lawfully present in the United States.
91. Argetsinger, supra note 24.
92. Equal Access Educ., 325 F. Supp. 2d at 659, 660.
93. Id. at 660.
94. Argetsinger, supra note 24.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 11, at 1.
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IV. FEDERAL STANDARDS AND THE RECENT LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ORDINANCES
With the growing perception that the federal government is unable and
perhaps unwilling to crack down on illegal immigration, and with Con-
gress deadlocked on immigration reform, state and local governments are
entering the fray in unprecedented numbers. For example, the National
Conference of State Legislatures reports that states proposed at least
1,404 separate pieces of immigration-related legislation in the first half of
2007, with 182 bills passing in 43 states-more than double the number of
laws enacted in all of 2006.98 More strikingly, these numbers do not in-
clude the recent wave of local ordinances, such as those passed in Hazle-
ton, Pennsylvania; Riverside, New Jersey; and Farmers Branch, Texas.
These three ordinances have recently taken their turns in court where,
again, the parties have struggled with the proper role, if any, state and
local actors should play in immigration and whether the use of federal
standards effectively saves sub-federal laws from preemption.
One of the earliest efforts came in July 2006, when the city of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance,
prohibiting businesses from hiring or contracting with "illegal aliens," and
fining landlords $1,000 for renting to an "illegal alien." 99 In August and
September 2006, the city passed additional ordinances further outlining
and expanding the prohibitions. 10 0
The initial ordinance targeted "illegal aliens," defining the term as "any
person whose initial entry into the United States was illegal and whose
current status is also illegal as well as any person who, after entering le-
gally, has failed to leave the United States upon the expiration of his or
her visa." 10' The ordinance did not cite any federal laws or regulations to
define "illegal alien," nor did it describe how employers and landlords
should determine who is an "illegal alien." Before the ordinance passed
in July 2006, Hazleton received a legal opinion from attorneys with the
Congressional Research Service, a federal agency within the U.S. Library
of Congress, that the ordinance might be preempted by federal law be-
cause it refers to "illegal aliens," even though federal law does not define
98. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, 2007
ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION 1, Aug. 5,
2007, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/2007Immigration831.htm; see also Anthony
Faiola, States' Immigrant Policies Diverge, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2007, at Al.
99. Hazleton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance 2006-10 (July 13, 2006),
available at http://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf.
100. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Oct. 11, 2006) (rental ordinance), and Ha-
zleton Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006) (Amended Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=5472. In December
2006 and early 2007, Hazleton amended and finalized the prior ordinances in Hazleton,
Pa., Ordinances 2006-40 and 2007-6 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.aclupa.org/
issues/immigrantsrights/hazleton/hazletonordinances.htm
101. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10, supra note 99, § 3.
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or even use this term.102
Hazleton revised its definition of "illegal alien" in the September 2006
version of the ordinance, stating that an "illegal alien" is an "alien who is
not 'lawfully present' in the United States according to" the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101.103 The amended ordi-
nance further declared that the city could not conclude that a person is an
"illegal alien" unless a city representative verified with the federal gov-
ernment under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) that the person is not "lawfully pre-
sent."'01 4 The updated ordinance also referred to federal statutes in
defining "unlawful worker.' 0 5 Thus, Hazleton tried to amend the ordi-
nance to rely both on federal standards and on federal determinations of
immigration status.
In August 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and
the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund filed suit on behalf
of several plaintiffs in federal district court in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. 10 6 In October 2006, the court granted a temporary re-
straining order enjoining Hazleton from enforcing the ordinance pending
the legal challenge.' 07 A year later, in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, the
court found that the ordinance's employment provisions conflicted with
specific federal laws. 08 More strikingly, the court held that federal law
also preempted the rental provisions because they not only conflicted
with federal law in classifying and regulating certain classes of immi-
grants, but because only the federal government, through formal removal
hearings, can conclusively determine whether someone is entitled to re-
main in the United States.' 09
On the latter issue, the court listed all the valid federal immigration
statuses that would trigger sanctions under the Hazleton ordinance."10
For example, the ordinance would have denied housing to asylum appli-
cants, aliens who had filed for adjustments of status or suspensions of
deportation, parolees, and aliens granted "deferred action"-all of whom
the federal government allows to work (and presumably live) in the
United States."1
More importantly, the court found that Hazleton's requirement that
city employees examine immigration documents and determine whether
immigrants are lawfully present in the United States conflicted with fed-
102. Memorandum from Jody Feder and Michael Garcia, Legislative Attorneys, Am.
Law Div., Cong. Research Serv., to Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, at CRS-4 (June 29, 2006),
available at http://www.assets.openers.com/rpts/-20060629.pdf.
103. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, supra note 100, § 3D.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 3E.
106. Complaint at 1, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(No. 06CV01586), 2006 WL 4385736.
107. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
108. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
109. Id. at 531-33.




eral law, because only the federal government can determine conclusively
who may remain in the United States under carefully prescribed formal
procedures set forth in federal statutes and regulations.112 In the court's
view, proceedings before immigration law judges are the "sole and exclu-
sive procedure" for determining whether an alien may be admitted to or
removed from the United States. 113 The court found that simply relying
on either the SAVE database or a federal employment verification pilot
program would not suffice to establish definitively which individuals the
federal government would seek to remove from the country." 4 Quoting
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Plyler v. Doe, the court acknowledged
that "the structure of the immigration statuses makes it impossible for the
State to determine which aliens are entitled to [lawful] residence, and
which eventually will be deported.""115 The court also quoted Justice
Powell's concurrence that "[u]ntil an undocumented alien is ordered de-
ported by the Federal government, no State can be assured that the alien
will not be found to have a federal permission to reside in the coun-
try. 11 6 In so holding, the court reached a much different conclusion than
the court in Equal Access Education regarding whether-as a legal or
practical matter-state and local actors can independently determine a
person's immigration status simply by referring to federal standards. 117
Just twelve days after Hazleton passed its ordinance, Riverside, New
Jersey, passed a substantially similar ordinance entitled "Riverside Town-
ship Illegal Immigration Relief Act."'11 Like Hazleton's ordinance, Riv-
erside's version banned employers and renters from doing business with
"illegal aliens," threatening to suspend the licenses of business owners for
at least five years, and threatening to fine landlords $1,000 for each viola-
tion.119 Also, like the initial Hazleton ordinance, Riverside's ordinance
provided no guidance to employers and landlords on how to identify "il-
legal aliens.' 20 But unlike Hazleton's ordinance, Riverside's version did
not even attempt to define "illegal alien.'1 21 Riverside initially amended
the ordinance, but again failed to elaborate what it meant by the term
"illegal alien.' 1 22 Finally, a third version of the ordinance adopted Hazle-
ton's definition of "illegal alien," citing to the INA and conditioning local
enforcement on verifying immigration status with federal authorities
112. Id. at 533 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2000) ("An immigration judge shall con-
duct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.")).
113. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3)).
114. Id. at 532.
115. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (1982)).
116. Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 241 n.6).
117. See Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004).









under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).123
The final version of the Riverside ordinance resembled the later ver-
sions of the Hazleton ordinance, making it similarly vulnerable to attack
on federal preemption grounds. In August 2006, a church and several
Latino clergy challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance in federal
district court in the District of New Jersey. 124 In October 2006, a coali-
tion of Riverside businesses, landlords, and residents sued the township
in state court. 125 After several months of briefing, Riverside Township
repealed the ordinance, citing its escalating legal expenses and the ad-
verse ruling in Lozano v. City of Hazleton.126
The third ordinance to draw national publicity was passed in Farmers
Branch, Texas. In November 2006, the Farmers Branch City Council
passed Ordinance 2892, prohibiting property owners and managers from
renting to "noncitizens."'1 27 Violations were punishable as misdemeanors
and subject to a $500 fine per day. 128 Unlike the Hazleton and Riverside
ordinances, the Farmers Branch ordinance did not refer at all to "illegal
aliens." Instead, it targeted "noncitizens," defining the term as anyone
who is not a "citizen" or a "national" of the United States.
129
The Farmers Branch ordinance required property owners and manag-
ers to gather and review "evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration
status" from prospective renters before entering into rental or lease
agreements.' 30 To prove citizenship or "eligible immigration status," the
ordinance required prospective renters to provide documents that would
be acceptable to prove "citizenship status" to U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement ("ICE"). 131 This ostensibly simple citation to federal
standards-with Farmers Branch vowing to accept immigration documen-
tation that is acceptable to ICE-was nonetheless muddled by text in the
preamble explaining that immigration determinations under the ordi-
nance were meant to be consistent with regulations used by the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to determine
who is eligible for federally subsidized housing.1 32 Like the Hazleton and
123. Riverside, N.J., Illegal Immigration Relief Act, Ordinance 2006-26 (Nov. 26, 2006),
available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0006.pdf.
124. Assembly of God Church Riverside v. Riverside, No. 1:06-cv-03842 (D.N.J. filed
Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0002-0001.
pdf.
125. Riverside Coal. of Bus. Pers. & Landlords v. Twp. of Riverside, L-2965-06 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. filed Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/
public/IM-NJ-0001-0001.pdf.
126. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds Repeal of Anti-
Immigrant Ordinance in Riverside, NJ (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants/31856prs20070917.html; Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws
Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007 at Al.
127. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://clearing
house.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-0001-0002.pdf.
128. Id. § 4.
129. Id. § 2(B)(2).
130. Id. § 2(B)(1).
131. Id. § 2(B)(3).
132. See id. at preamble.
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Riverside ordinances, the Farmers Branch ordinance was strategically re-
vised during litigation, but the amended version continued to cite to both
ICE and HUD standards. 133
In December 2006 and January 2007, four different lawsuits challenging
the ordinance were filed against the City of Farmers Branch-three in
federal court and one in state court. 134 The three federal suits were con-
solidated before Judge Lindsay in the Northern District of Texas, who
granted a temporary restraining order in May 2007 after voters had over-
whelmingly approved the final amended version of the ordinance. 135 In
June 2007, in Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, the
federal court granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction enjoining Farmers
Branch from enforcing the ordinance. 136
The court scrutinized the ordinance under the familiar three test in De-
Canas, but found it necessary to apply only the first test, asking whether
the ordinance was an impermissible "regulation of immigration."1 37 In
applying this test, the court cited Equal Access Education I for the pro-
position that states must simply adopt federal standards to avoid preemp-
tion.13 8 Nevertheless, the court held that the Farmers Branch ordinance
was preempted because it relied on the wrong federal standards. 139 The
ordinance adopted HUD regulations for determining which noncitizens
are eligible for federally subsidized housing. 140 Of course, as the court
recognized, these HUD regulations "simply determine which noncitizens
are eligible for federal housing subsidies"; they "do not determine
whether a person is legally or illegally in the United States."' 14 1 Indeed,
the HUD regulations prohibit certain individuals who are otherwise law-
fully present in the United States from receiving federal housing assis-
tance. 14 2 For example, HUD regulations prohibit temporary alien
visitors, tourists, diplomats, and students from receiving federally subsi-
dized housing. 143 By bootstrapping the ordinance to HUD regulations,
the ordinance effectively prohibited groups of "legal noncitizens" from
133. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ci.
farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/Proposed% 200rdinance %202903.doc.
134. The three federal cases were Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch,
No. 3:06-CV-02371 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 22, 2006); Vasquez v. City of Farmers Branch, No.
3:06-CV-2376 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 26, 2006); and Barrietos v. City of Farmers Branch, No.
3:07-CV-00061-G (N.D. Tex. filed Jan. 11, 2007). The state case was filed as Ramos v. City
of Farmers Branch, No. 06-12227 (116th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. filed Dec. 4, 2006).
135. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:06-CV-02371, 2007
WL 1498763, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007).
136. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760-61
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
137. Id. at 764-72.
138. Id. at 766.
139. Id. at 768-72.
140. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2892 (Jan. 8, 2007), supra note 127 (citing
HUD regulations at 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.500-.528 (1996)).
141. Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 768.




renting apartments in Farmers Branch.144 As the court noted, "a landlord
who rents to certain noncitizens who are legally in the country tempora-
rily, such as students, would be subject to criminal sanctions. 1 45 The
court found this scheme to be inconsistent with federal immigration stan-
dards, and thus preempted it as an attempt to "regulate immigration"
under the first DeCanas test.146
The court also took exception to the provisions requiring property
owners and managers to collect and review documents in order to verify
the citizenship or immigration status for each prospective renter.147 Cit-
ing LULAC I, the court found that these requirements burdened private
citizens, particularly because the ordinance required them to use non-fed-
eral standards. 148
V. ARE FEDERAL STANDARDS ENOUGH TO
AVOID PREEMPTION?
Can state and local immigration-related laws avoid federal preemption
simply by using federal immigration standards? And what does it mean
to use federal standards? Is this merely a requirement that the state stat-
ute or local ordinance explicitly refer to or cite federal standards? Or
does it require courts to determine the likelihood that state or local actors
will systematically misapply federal standards? Should courts presume,
before a law is enacted, that state and local actors are qualified to faith-
fully apply the complex web of federal immigration statutes, regulations,
and guidelines? Or should courts presume the opposite?
In Equal Access Education, the court suggested that Virginia's policy
would be constitutional if the schools simply relied on "federal stan-
dards. 1 49 However, in dicta, the court tied this analysis to the second-
order question of whether the schools made so many mistakes in applying
federal standards that they effectively used their own, state-created stan-
dards. 150 In DeCanas, the Supreme Court seemed satisfied that the Cali-
fornia regulations cited to federal immigration standards, but the Court
did not scrutinize whether employers would systematically misapply these
standards. 151 In LULAC I, the court distinguished verifying immigration
status, such as through a federal database like SAVE, from independently
determining immigration status, precisely because of the high likelihood
that determinations by state agents would be inconsistent and
inaccurate.1 52
144. Id. at 769.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 770-72.
148. Id.
149. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 673 (E.D. Va. 2004).
150. Id.
151. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 364-65 (1976).




The recent local ordinance cases in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Texas spotlight the legal and practical difficulties of simply referring to
federal immigration standards and entrusting these determinations to
state and local actors. In Farmers Branch, the court struck down the
rental ordinance because it cited to the wrong federal standards 153 and
objected to the burden it placed on property owners and managers to
ascertain the immigration status of rental applicants. 154
Yet the strongest rebuke came from the court in Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, which invalidated the ordinance not only because it conflicted
with federal standards, but because it found that only the federal govern-
ment, through formal removal hearings, can conclusively determine
whether someone is entitled to remain in the United States. 55 Citing
Plyler v. Doe, the Lozano court found that simply relying on federal
databases would not establish definitively which individuals the federal
government would seek to remove from the country. 156 Thus, according
to the Lozano court, federal law leaves virtually no room for state and
local actors to determine a person's immigration status, even if the state
or local law instructs them to rely on federal standards (or even federal
databases). 157
Hector Villagra also argues persuasively that simply using federal stan-
dards does not rescue a state or local law from conflicting with and thus
being preempted by federal immigration law. 158 Villagra argues that the
court in Equal Access Education misapplied the first DeCanas test by ask-
ing whether the state had adopted federal standards, rather than asking
whether the state scheme had a direct and substantial impact on immigra-
tion. 59 Thus, Villagra observes, "a state cannot gain the power to engage
in regulation of immigration simply by incorporating federal stan-
dards.' 160 Even state and local laws that rely on federal standards would
be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if the laws "impermissibly
delegated to state and local employees the discretion to make indepen-
dent judgments about the application of federal immigration law."' 161
Echoing the distinction made by the court in LULAC I, and by the
plaintiffs in Equal Access Education, 62 Villagra also distinguishes be-
tween verifying eligibility for state benefits and verifying immigration sta-
153. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 755, 768-72
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
154. Id. at 770-72.
155. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 531-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
156. Id. at 532.
157. See id.
158. Hector 0. Villagra, Arizona's Proposition 200 and the Supremacy of Federal Law:
Elements of Law, Politics, and Faith, 2 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 295, 315
(2006).
159. Id. at 315 n.103 (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)).
160. Id. at 315 n.103.
161. Id. at 315.
162. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary




tus. 163 Benefit programs frequently require state and local government
personnel to determine whether applicants are eligible for state benefits
by asking if they possess an immigration status that qualifies for benefits
under federal law. 164 If an applicant cannot show an immigration status
that qualifies for benefits, state and local personnel make no further in-
quiry. 165 As Villagra observes, "[t]here is no need to verify the appli-
cant's actual (as opposed to proffered or claimed) immigration status.' 66
Verifying proof of eligibility is thus significantly different from verifying
immigration status, which requires ascertaining the applicant's actual im-
migration status. 167
In Virginia, the Attorney General asked admissions officers and other
personnel at public colleges and universities to ascertain whether appli-
cants were lawfully present in the United States, not merely whether ap-
plicants were eligible for enrollment according to federal immigration
law. 168 Yet, as Professor Benson notes, even if the Virginia Attorney
General did require schools to use specific federal laws and standards, it
is unrealistic to expect admissions officers to determine the immigration
status of applicants without making significant errors.169 Moreover, ask-
ing school employees to report students to federal authorities only raises
the magnitude of these errors.
As Professor Benson notes, "[t]he terms temporary protected status,
refugee, asylum applicant, F-i, G-4, J-2, deferred action, and parolee are
just a handful of labels for the varied categories in our immigration
laws.' 70 Thus, state and local attempts to place the burden of determin-
ing immigration status on state agents, local landlords, or employers fail
to grasp the complexities of our immigration system. Perhaps this harsh
reality is the most persuasive policy reason that federal law should occupy
the entire field of determining immigration status. 17' As Professor Olivas
notes, "shifting immigration enforcement powers to sub-federal levels
will more likely lead to weaker federal enforcement.' 72 As Olivas notes,
and as I have argued in this Article, "it is bad policy and will lead to bad
163. Villagra, supra note 158, at 313-14.
164. For example, only certain classes of immigrants are eligible for state Medicaid ben-
efits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(b)(2) (1999). In general, an applicant must be a "qualified"
alien, a nonimmigrant under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, or an alien paroled
into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (1998).
165. Villagra, supra note 158, at 314.
166. Id.
167. For example, states require applicants for voter's registration cards and driver's
licenses to show proof of citizenship, but most of these programs appear to adopt whole-
sale federal immigration standards. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 770 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
168. See Virginia Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 11, at 11.
169. Benson, supra note 88, at 733-34.
170. Id. at 734 (internal citations omitted).
171. Mr. Villagra argues this point with regard to Arizona's Proposition 200, a compre-
hensive initiative approved in 2004 by Arizona voters to address the perceived problems
with immigration. Villagra, supra note 158, at 315.





In the tug-of-war between federal and sub-federal laws that touch im-
migration, local governments have recently tugged with great force,
driven by their palpable frustration with the federal government's failure
to regulate effectively. But federal courts have tugged back with equal
muscle, striking down local ordinances that either butchered federal stan-
dards or delegated responsibility to local actors to make determinations
of immigration status. These recent cases have cited the Virginia public
colleges case for the lesson that state or local laws that touch immigration
must rely on federal standards to avoid preemption.
Yet another important lesson from the Virginia case was that states
effectively would be using non-federal immigration standards if they sys-
tematically misapplied federal standards. The court in Lozano v. City of
Hazleton grasped this concept, holding that only federal immigration
judges can conclusively determine who is lawfully present. 174 These cases
teach that if there is a place for state and local governments in the legal
tug-of-war over immigration, it is in verifying eligibility for state or local
benefits. State or local actors should not be relied upon to make inde-
pendent, discretionary determinations of immigration status, even if they
are directed to use federal standards.
173. Id.
174. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 531-33 (MD. Pa. 2007).
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